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Voluntary Corporate Governance Disclosures by Post-Apartheid South African 
Corporations 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Purpose – This paper investigates as to whether post-Apartheid South African (SA) 
listed corporations voluntarily comply with and disclose recommended good corporate 
governance (CG) practices and, if so, the major factors that influence such voluntary CG 
disclosure behaviour. 
Design/methodology/approach – We construct a broad voluntary CG disclosure index 
containing 50 CG provisions from the 2002 King Report using a sample of 169 SA listed 
corporations from 2002 to 2006. We also conduct regression analysis to identify the main 
drivers of voluntary CG disclosure. 
Findings – Our results suggest that while compliance with, and disclosure of, good CG 
practices varies substantially among the sampled companies, CG standards have 
generally improved over the five-year period examined. We also find that block 
ownership is negatively associated with voluntary CG disclosure, while board size, audit 
firm size, cross-listing, the presence of a CG committee, government ownership and 
institutional ownership are positively related to voluntary CG disclosure. 
Practical implications – Our findings have important implications for policy-makers and 
regulators. Evidence of improving CG standards implies that efforts by various 
stakeholders at improving CG standards in SA companies have had some positive impact 
on CG practices of SA firms. However, the substantial variation in the levels of 
compliance implies that enforcement may need to be strengthened further. 
Originality/value –  There is a dearth of evidence on the level of compliance with the 
King Report. Our study fills this gap by providing evidence for the first time on the level 
of compliance achieved, as well as contributing generally to the literature on compliance 
with codes of good governance and voluntary disclosure. 
 
Keywords: Voluntary disclosure, Corporate governance, Affirmative action, King Report, 
South Africa 
 
Article type: Research paper
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1. Introduction 
Recent decades have witnessed a proliferating interest in corporate governance 
(CG) (Collett and Hrasky, 2005; Filatotchev and Boyd, 2009), following well-publicised 
cases of major corporate scandals and failures in developed countries, which were 
attributed mainly to poor CG practices (Cadbury Report, 1992; Deutsche Bank, 2002). 
Interest in CG was particularly heightened by the 1997/1998 Asian economic crisis, 
which demonstrated that macro-economic difficulties could be worsened by systematic 
CG failures in developing countries (King Report, 2002; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006), 
resulting in a relative explosion globally in the issuance of codes of good CG that 
generally seek to improve the way in which corporations are governed by encouraging 
greater transparency, accountability and responsibility (Cadbury Report, 1992; King 
Report, 2002; Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009; Cicon et al., 2010). 
However, the ability of CG codes to achieve good governance depends on the 
extent to which companies are willing to engage in effective voluntary compliance and 
disclosure (Core, 2001; Healy and Palepu, 2001). Despite the increasing number of CG 
codes in developing countries (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009), existing studies 
examining the levels of compliance with CG codes are disproportionately concentrated in 
a few developed countries (Conyon, 1994; Conyon and Mallin, 1997; Pellens et al., 2001; 
Bebenroth, 2005; Cromme, 2005; Werder et al., 2005; MacNeil and Li, 2006; Pass, 2006; 
Hegazy and Hegazy, 2010). Arguably, in developing countries with different institutional 
settings and CG structures (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009; West, 2009), voluntary 
compliance with CG codes can be expected to differ from what has been reported in 
developed countries. Thus, an examination of voluntary CG disclosures in developing 
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countries, where there is limited empirical evidence, is crucial in providing a more 
complete understanding of corporate voluntary compliance and disclosure behaviour.  
In this paper, we examine voluntary CG disclosures in South Africa (SA). In line 
with global developments, SA has experienced significant CG reforms, which can be 
specifically dated back to the collapse of Apartheid in 1994. In fact, SA was the first 
developing country to introduce a code of good governance in the form of the 1994 and 
2002 King Reports (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009). As will be discussed further, 
and distinct from those of other Anglo-American countries, the King Reports explicitly 
require firms to go beyond the financial and regulatory aspects of CG by taking into 
account the interests of a wide range of stakeholders, such as local communities, 
employees and customers (King Report, 2002; West, 2009). Similar to other Anglo-
American countries, the King Reports adopt a UK-style ‘comply or explain’ compliance 
and disclosure regime. However, critical concerns (Kakabadse and Korac-Kakabadse, 
2002; Andreasson, 2010) have been raised as to whether a voluntary compliance and 
disclosure regime can be effective in improving governance practices, given the nature of 
its corporate context.  
Briefly, the post-Apartheid SA corporate setting is uniquely characterised by 
concentrated ownership, weak enforcement of corporate regulations, high levels of 
institutional ownership and weaker shareholder activism, as well as distinctive features 
relating to the greater need to meet affirmative action and stakeholder CG provisions, 
such as black economic empowerment and with regard to HIV/Aids (Bar et al., 1995; 
Armstrong et al., 2006; Ntim, 2009). In particular, concentrated ownership renders the 
market for corporate control weak (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006), which can impact 
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negatively on the willingness of corporations to engage in voluntary compliance and 
disclosure, and thereby limits the ability of a voluntary code to improve CG standards.  
Despite the relative uniqueness of the SA context and the voluntary nature of the 
King Reports, there is a clear dearth of empirical studies analysing the level of 
compliance achieved (Okeahalam, 2004; Mangena and Chamisa, 2008). For example, the 
Institute of International Finance (IIF) 2007 Report assessing CG implementation and 
practices in emerging markets indicates that while SA appears to have a sound and well-
developed CG framework in the form of the King Code, no study has been done to 
ascertain the actual levels of compliance among listed firms. Specifically, the IIF Report 
on SA states that “… to date, no study has been conducted to assess the level of 
compliance with corporate governance-related requirements among listed companies or 
to verify the reasons for non-compliance” (IIF, 2007, p. 1).  
However, there are a limited number of prior cross-country disclosure studies 
whose samples include a number of SA listed firms that need to be acknowledged. Firer 
and Meth (1986) examine the information requirements of SA investment analysts and 
compare them with their UK counterparts. Using a disclosure index of 49 voluntary items 
for 36 listed SA firms from 1979 to 1983, they report low levels of voluntary disclosure 
among SA firms in comparison with their UK counterparts. Similarly, using the Standard 
& Poor’s CG disclosure index and a sample of 354 firms from 19 emerging markets, 
including 12 non-financial SA firms from 1998 to 2000, Patel et al. (2002) investigate the 
level of transparency and disclosure among listed firms in different emerging markets. 
Their results suggest that Asian emerging markets and SA have significantly higher 
transparency and disclosure practices compared with their Latin American, Eastern 
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European, and Middle Eastern counterparts. Further, Khan (2009) uses a 2006 cross-
sectional sample of 200 firms from 41 countries that have cross-listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE), including 4 SA firms to, investigate the level of compliance 
with three mandatory disclosure requirements on their websites: disclosure on the 
differences between NYSE CG rules and national ones, information on the audit 
committee, and the disclosure of the audit committee charter. The findings of the study 
indicate that there is a gap between the minimum NYSE’s disclosure requirements for 
foreign firms and what is actually disclosed on the websites in relation to CG disclosure.  
The current study differs from existing ones in a number of ways. First, while our 
study seeks to specifically examine the levels of compliance with recent CG disclosure 
policy reforms in the form of the 2002 King Report among SA listed firms, existing ones 
are either general international comparison disclosure (in the case of Firer and Smith 
1986) or CG disclosure (in the case of Patel et al. 2002 and Khan 2009) studies, which 
are differently focused. Second, and apart from differences in focus, the samples used by 
existing cross-country studies are discernibly smaller in comparison to the size of the 
current sample, which arguably limits the generalisation of their findings for SA listed 
firms. Finally, our study investigates voluntary CG disclosures over the 2002 to 2006 
period, which is more recent compared with the periods examined by existing cross-
country studies and therefore, the current investigation can also be considered as an 
extension to prior studies.     
Given this background, the main purpose of this paper is to investigate whether 
and to what extent post-Apartheid SA listed corporations voluntarily comply with and 
disclose recommended good practices and, if so, the major SA context-specific, as well as 
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general factors influencing such voluntary CG disclosure behaviour. In doing so, we 
make a number of distinct contributions to the extant literature. First, using CG data 
extracted directly from annual reports, we provide for the first time detailed evidence on 
the level of compliance with the 2002 King Report (King II) by constructing a broad CG 
compliance and disclosure index containing 50 CG provisions using a sample of 169 SA 
listed corporations from 2002 to 2006.  Distinctively, but in line with the CG provisions 
of King II, our broad compliance and disclosure index includes conventional CG 
mechanisms, such as those relating to board and directors, as well as SA context-specific 
affirmative action and stakeholder provisions. Second, we provide evidence on the main 
factors driving the level of voluntary compliance and disclosure of good CG practices 
among SA listed corporations. This can improve our understanding of the major factors 
that influence the level of voluntary compliance and disclosure of CG practices in a major 
developing country in which various stakeholders, such as the government, the Institute 
of Directors and the Johannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE) Ltd take a keen interest in 
CG, affirmative action and stakeholder issues.  
 Our analysis of the factors influencing voluntary CG compliance and disclosure 
suggests that ownership and other CG variables are generally significant in explaining 
variations in voluntary CG disclosure. Specifically, our results suggest that an increase in 
block ownership significantly reduces voluntary CG disclosure, implying substitutability 
between block ownership and CG disclosure, as a managerial monitoring mechanism. In 
contrast, we find that companies with larger boards, a big-four auditor, higher 
government ownership, a CG committee and higher institutional ownership, disclose 
considerably more; an indication that these variables are complementary to voluntary CG 
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disclosure. Our results are generally robust to whether we use a weighted or an 
unweighted index of CG disclosure and whether or not we control for firm fixed-effects. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section provides an 
overview of the institutional framework of CG in South Africa. The following sections 
review the prior literature and hypotheses development, describe the data and research 
methodology, and report empirical and robustness results, while the conclusion contains a 
summary and a brief discussion of policy implications. 
 
2. The institutional framework for corporate governance in South Africa 
Corporate governance in SA was formally institutionalised by the publication of 
the first King Report (King I) in 1994 (Armstrong et al., 2006; West, 2009). The 
publication of King I coincided with the collapse of Apartheid, the historic release of 
Nelson Mandela from prison and the subsequent assumption to power by the black 
dominated African National Congress (ANC). The recommendations of King I were 
heavily informed by those of the UK’s Cadbury Report of 1992 (Mangena and Chamisa, 
2008). For example, and in line with the Cadbury Report, King I adopted an Anglo-
American style unitary board of directors, consisting of executive and non-executive 
directors (NEDs), who are primarily accountable to shareholders with a voluntary 
(‘comply or explain’) compliance and disclosure regime.  
King I was replaced in 2002 with a second King Report (King II) following 
important international and domestic developments. Internationally, new codes of CG, 
which promulgated new CG standards, such as the UK’s 1998 Combined Code, had been 
introduced. Domestically, and most importantly, under the new neo-liberal economic 
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policy of encouraging growth, employment and redistribution (GEAR strategy), the 
ruling ANC passed a number of affirmative action and stakeholder laws on black 
economic empowerment and HIV/Aids (see Section 4 of the Appendix). These were 
aimed at addressing historical socio-economic racial inequalities and needed to be 
incorporated into the governance of mainstream SA corporations. As a consequence, a 
major distinguishing feature of King II, compared with other Anglo-American CG Codes, 
is that it adopted the ‘inclusive’ approach (West, 2009; Andreasson, 2010) to compliance, 
that maintains and strengthens the Anglo-American (shareholding) features (see Sections 
1 to 3 of the Appendix), while also incorporating substantial SA context-specific 
affirmative action and stakeholder demands (stakeholding). While these features make 
the South African CG model a hybrid and unique among other Anglo-American countries 
(West, 2009; Andreasson, 2010), critical concerns have been expressed as to whether, 
given the uniqueness of the SA corporate setting, a voluntary compliance and disclosure 
regime like King II can be effective in raising CG standards in SA. As such, we seek to 
empirically examine the level of compliance with King II, as well as investigate the major 
factors influencing voluntary compliance and disclosure of good CG practices among 
post-Apartheid SA listed corporations.   
  
3. Prior literature and hypotheses development 
 Prior literature (Cooke, 1992; Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; 
Patel et al., 2002; Collett and Hrasky, 2005; Cheng and Courtenay, 2006) has identified a 
number of variables that can influence corporate disclosure. We draw from this literature, 
as well as the SA corporate setting, to identify factors that are likely to influence the level 
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of voluntary compliance and disclosure of good CG practices. Specifically, we examine 
ownership structure variables, including block, government and institutional ownerships, 
as well as other CG variables, namely board size, cross-listing, audit firm size and the 
presence of a CG committee. As previously explained, these variables, especially block 
ownerships by large companies and government, are pervasive in SA and therefore 
considered to be specific to the SA corporate context. 
 
3.1 Ownership structure variables  
Greater managerial monitoring and lesser information asymmetry associated with 
block ownership can be expected to reduce agency costs and improve firm value (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976), and thus a reduced need for corporate disclosure. By contrast, 
diffused ownership requires greater monitoring, which can be reduced through increased 
corporate disclosure (Enk and Mak, 2003). Consistent with the results of Patel et al. 
(2002) for a cross-country sample of 354 firms from 19 emerging markets, including 12 
non-financial SA listed firms, Barako et al. (2006) report a negative association between 
block ownership and voluntary disclosure for a sample of 43 Kenyan listed firms, while 
Mangena and Chamisa (2008) find that incidences of listing suspension in a sample of 81 
SA firms is higher in corporations with greater block ownership. Corporate ownership in 
SA has historically been dominated by a small set of very large companies built around 
highly complicated cross-holdings and tall pyramids (Barr et al., 1995; Okeahalam, 2004) 
and, as such, block ownership is more likely to influence voluntary CG disclosure. 
Therefore, our first hypothesis is that: 
H1:  There is a statistically significant negative association between block  
ownership and the level of voluntary compliance and disclosure of good  
CG practices.  
 9  
 
 
Due to their larger ownership stakes, institutional shareholders have extra 
motivation to monitor corporate disclosure and thus, more information will be voluntarily 
disclosed by managers to meet the expectations of large institutional shareholders 
(Barako et al., 2006). Haniffa and Cooke (2002) and Barako et al. (2006) report a 
positive association between institutional ownership and corporate disclosure in samples 
of 167 Malaysian and 43 Kenyan listed firms, respectively. Within the SA context, 
institutional ownership is likely to be a relevant driver of corporate disclosure because the 
use of pyramidical structures means that institutional ownership is intrinsically pervasive 
(Barr et al., 1995; Okeahalam, 2004). King II also encourages greater activism by 
institutional shareholders to improve CG and disclosure practices in SA firms and, thus, 
our second hypothesis is that: 
H2:  There is a statistically significant positive association between 
institutional ownership and the level of voluntary compliance and 
disclosure of good CG practices.  
 
Corporations with greater government ownership can have access to resources, 
such as finance and contracts that can increase performance (Malherbe and Segal, 2003; 
Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). However, associated political interference and conflict of 
interests between shareholders and government will require greater levels of corporate 
disclosure (Eng and Mak, 2003). The empirical literature relating to the association 
between government ownership and corporate disclosure is limited, although Eng and 
Mak (2003) report that government ownership impacts positively on voluntary disclosure. 
The SA government holds significant ownership stakes in large public and private 
corporations through the Public Investment Commission (PIC) with keen interest in CG, 
affirmative action and stakeholder issues and, hence, our third hypothesis is that: 
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H3:  There is a statistically significant positive association between government  
ownership and the level of voluntary compliance and disclosure of good  
CG practices. 
 
 
3.2 Other corporate governance variables 
Greater managerial monitoring power associated with larger boards can impact 
positively on disclosure and performance (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). By contrast, 
Jensen (1993) argues that larger boards are associated with poor communication and 
monitoring, which can have a negative effect on disclosure and performance. Ho and 
Williams (2003) report no link between board size and performance in a sample of 84 SA 
corporations, while Mangena and Chamisa (2008) indicate that board size has no impact 
on incidences of listing suspensions using a sample of 81 SA firms. King II does not 
specify the exact number of directors that should form a board, but sets out a general 
principle that every board must consider whether its size makes it effective, indicating 
that it considers board size as an important CG mechanism. Given the mixed theoretical 
and empirical literature, however, our fourth hypothesis is that: 
H4:  There is a statistically significant association between board size and the  
level of voluntary compliance and disclosure of good CG practices.  
 
Previous studies (Meek et al., 1995; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002) suggest that 
corporations that cross-list on foreign stock markets tend to have better CG and 
disclosures practices, as they are subjected to additional accounting, governance and 
disclosure requirements. Meek et al. (1995) and Collett and Hrasky (2005) find that 
cross-listing impacts positively on corporate disclosure. Similarly, an opinion-based 
survey conducted by the Deutsche Bank (2002) among analysts in emerging markets, 
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including SA, suggests that cross-listed firms tend to have better CG and disclosure 
standards than their non-cross-listed counterparts. Hence, our fifth hypothesis is that: 
H5:  There is a statistically significant positive association between cross- 
listing and the level  of voluntary compliance and disclosure of good CG  
practices. 
 
Audit firm size has been suggested to have a positive influence on corporate 
disclosure (Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Eng and Mak, 2003) and audit quality (DeAngelo, 
1981). This is because larger audit firms have greater financial strength, experience, 
expertise, information and knowledge (DeAngelo, 1981; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002), 
which improves their independence and ability to limit opportunistic activities of 
managers, and a number of studies have reported a positive association between audit 
firm size and corporate disclosure (Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Eng and Mak, 2003). Also, King 
II recognises external auditors as one of the key stakeholders in ensuring that SA firms 
voluntarily comply with its CG provisions. Therefore, our sixth hypothesis is that: 
H6:  There is a statistically significant positive association between audit firm 
size and the level of voluntary compliance and disclosure of good CG  
practices. 
 
King II does not require SA corporations to establish CG committees to 
continuously monitor compliance with its CG requirements. However, it is expected that 
companies that voluntarily set up CG committees to specifically monitor their compliance 
are more likely to engage in good CG practices and disclose more than those that do not 
have CG committees (Core, 2001; Ntim, 2009). The association between the presence of 
a CG committee and corporate disclosure is under-researched, and this makes it a fertile 
area for investigation, especially in SA where there is a clear dearth of voluntary CG 
disclosure studies. Thus, our final hypothesis is that: 
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H7:  There is a statistically significant positive association between the 
presence of a CG committee and the level of voluntary compliance and  
disclosure of good CG practices. 
 
4. Data and research methodology 
4.1 Data: sample selection, sources, and description 
The sample for the study is drawn from all 291 non-financial companies[1] listed 
on the JSE Ltd as at the end of 2006 and Table I contains a summary of the sample 
selection procedure. Panel A of Table I contains the industrial composition of all non-
financial companies that were listed on the JSE, while Panel B of Table I contains the 
final sampled companies with full data. 
Insert Table I about here  
The CG disclosures were extracted from the sampled companies’ annual reports 
collected from the Perfect Information Database, while the accounting variables were 
obtained from DataStream. We set two criteria for company selection in our final sample: 
the availability of a company’s full five-year annual reports from 2002 to 2006 inclusive 
and the availability of a firm’s corresponding accounting data for the same period. The 
criteria were set for several reasons. First, and following prior studies (Eng and Mak, 
2003; Barako et al., 2006; Henry, 2008), the criteria helped in meeting the requirements 
for a balanced panel data analysis. Gujarati (2003) suggests that there are advantages for 
using panel data, involving both cross-sectional and time-series observations, more 
degrees of freedom and less muliti-collinearity among variables. Second, examination of 
five-year data with both cross-sectional and time-series properties may help in 
determining whether the observed cross-sectional link between voluntary CG disclosure 
and its drivers also holds over time. Third, the sample begins in 2002 because data 
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coverage in the Perfect Information Database/DataStream on SA listed companies is 
very low prior to 2002 and crucially because King II came into operation in 2002. The 
sample ends in 2006 because it is the most recent year for which data was available. As 
presented in Panel B of Table I, the full data required is obtained for a total of 169 out of 
the 291 companies[2] for the five firm-years and 8 industries in our analysis.  
 
4.2 Research methodology:  definition of variables and model specification 
Fundamental to our analysis is the construction of a general index, SACGDI, 
which is employed as a voluntary CG compliance and disclosure index. The SACGDI 
contains 50 CG provisions based on the five broad sections of King II covering: (1) 
boards, directors and ownership, (2) accounting and auditing, (3) risk management, 
internal audit and control, (4) integrated sustainability reporting, and (5) compliance and 
enforcement. The detailed provisions are contained in the Appendix. The SACGDI is 
constructed by awarding a value of ‘1’ if any of the 50 CG provisions of King II is 
disclosed in an annual report and zero otherwise[3]. With this scheme, a company’s total 
disclosure score in a particular firm-year can vary between zero (0%) to fifty (100%), 
with higher index levels indicating better compliance and disclosure.  
Even though this simple dichotomous weighting scheme may be unable to capture 
the relative significance of the various CG provisions (Marston and Shrives, 1991; 
Beattie et al., 2004; Barako et al., 2006), we adopt it for a number of reasons. First, given 
the lack of a rigorously developed theoretical framework on which weights could be 
correctly assigned to different CG provisions, using an unweighted coding scheme avoids 
a situation whereby our disclosure index is excessively biased towards a particular set of 
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CG provisions (Marston and Shrives, 1991; Botosan, 1997; Owusu-Ansah, 1998). Second, 
the findings of prior studies indicate that the use of weighted and unweighted indices tend 
to give similar results (Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Barako et al., 2006). Finally, dichotomously 
scoring disclosures in annual reports is supported by a rigorously established theoretical 
and empirical literature (Marston and Shrives, 1991; Meek et al., 1995; Collett and 
Hrasky, 2005; Beattie and Thomson, 2007; Tsamenyi et al., 2007; Henry, 2008).  
To reduce potential omitted variables bias, we include a number of control 
variables, as detailed below. Unlike the ownership and CG proxies, these variables are 
common across different studies and, as such, considered to be a general test of the 
determinants of voluntary CG disclosures.  Table II presents summary definitions of all 
variables employed, including the dependent (SACGDI), independent (specific) and 
control (general) variables. 
Insert Table II about here 
  
Due to greater agency problems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and higher political 
costs (Meek et al., 1995; Tsamenyi et al., 2007), larger firms can be expected to 
voluntarily disclose more. Similarly, highly geared firms can be anticipated to disclose 
more to assure their creditors of the likelihood of honouring their debts (Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2002), while firms with higher investment and growth opportunities have greater 
need for external funds and, thus, can be expected to engage in higher disclosure to 
reduce information asymmetry (Eng and Mak, 2003; Collett and Hrasky, 2005). Further, 
managers of profitable companies may disclose more to justify higher compensation 
(Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Barako et al., 2006) and, as such, we expect firm size (LNTA), 
gearing (GEAR), profitability (ROA), growth (GROWTH), and capital expenditure 
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(CAPEX) to relate positively to the SACGDI. Finally, following prior research (Cooke, 
1992; Barako et al., 2006; Henry, 2008), we predict that the SACGDI will vary across 
different industries and financial years and, thus, we introduce year (2002 to 2006) and 
industry dummies for the five remaining industries[4]. Assuming that all relationships are 
linear, our main OLS regression equation to be estimated is specified as: 
            
∑
=
+++++
++++=
n
i
ititiititit
ititititit
CONTROLSCGCOMBBIGCROSLIST
BSIZEINSOWNGOVOWNBLKOWNSACGDI
1
765
43210
4 εβββ
ββββα
       (1)  
where: 
SACGDI                               - South African corporate governance disclosure index 
0α             - Constant term. 
BLKOWN           - Block ownership 
GOVOWN           - Government ownership 
INSOWN           - Institutional ownership 
BSIZE            - Board size 
CROSLIST           - Cross-listing 
BIG4            - Audit firm size 
CGCOM            - Presence of a corporate governance committee 
CONTROLS           - Control variables for growth (GROWTH), capital  
expenditure (CAPEX), gearing (GEAR), firm size (LNTA),  
profitability (ROA), industry and year dummies. 
ε             -  Error term. 
 
We discuss the empirical results, including descriptive statistics and regression 
analyses in the following section. 
  
 
5. Empirical results  
5.1 Empirical results: descriptive statistics and univariate regression analysis 
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 Summary descriptive statistics of all variables included in our analysis are 
contained in Table III. All the variables generally exhibit wide spreads. For example, 
block ownership ranges from a minimum of 10% to a maximum of 92% with a mean of 
62%[5]. Consistent with the findings of previous studies (Deutsche Bank, 2002; Ho and 
Williams, 2003), board size is between 4 and 18 with a median of 10 board members. The 
figures for audit firm size, cross-listing, government and institutional ownerships, as well 
as the control variables indicate substantial variation in our sample, hence minimising 
possibilities of sample selection bias. Crucially, there is also substantial degree of 
dispersion in the distribution of the SACGDI, ranging from a minimum of 6% (3 out of 50 
items disclosed) to a maximum of 98% (49 out of 50) with the average company 
complying with 61% of the 50 CG provisions examined.  
Insert Table III about here 
To examine the levels of improvement in compliance, as well as ascertaining the 
CG provisions that contribute most to the degree of variation observed in the aggregate 
levels of compliance with the SACGDI, we investigate the levels of compliance among 
the sampled companies with the individual CG provisions that constitute the SACGDI. 
Table IV reports the percentage levels of compliance with the CG provisions for the 
pooled sample, as well as for each of the five firm-years. Row 3 of Table IV reports 
aggregate levels of compliance, while Row 4 does similarly for the individual CG 
provisions. 
Consistent with the results of past studies (Patel et al., 2002; Barako et al., 2006; 
Henry, 2008), the findings in Row 3 indicate that compliance with the CG provisions 
generally improves over time, with the aggregate compliance levels increasing from 47% 
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in 2002 to 69% in 2006. The results in Row 4 show that there are substantial variations in 
the levels of compliance with the individual CG provisions among the sampled 
companies, ranging from 100% (perfect compliance) in the case of the existence of the 
office of a company secretary to 0% (complete non-compliance) with respect to the 
contribution to the development of financial journalism. The perfect compliance with the 
office of company secretary is consistent with the provisions of the 1973 Companies Act 
and the 2007 JSE Listings Rules. Both regulations mandate every company to maintain a 
well-resourced office of a company secretary to ensure that the board functions 
effectively. The complete non-compliance with contribution to the development of 
financial journalism supports suggestions that due to financial and manpower constraints, 
enforcement of corporate regulations is weak (Deutsche Bank, 2002; IIF, 2007).  
For eight (16%) provisions, such as the disclosure of company risks, compliance 
levels are comparatively high, with 90% or more of the sampled companies complying 
with these provisions. By contrast, for 11 (22%) provisions, such as having an 
independent board chairperson, compliance levels are relatively low, with 40% or less of 
the sampled firms complying with these provisions. For the 29 remaining provisions, 
compliance levels are intermediate, ranging between 46% and 86%. Overall, the main 
evidence that emerges from examining the full sample of companies is that despite the 
expectation that the introduction of King II would speed-up convergence of CG standards 
(Malherbe and Segal, 2003; Armstrong et al., 2006), CG practices among SA listed 
corporations still vary substantially. While this is consistent with the variation in 
compliance levels reported by past studies (Deutsche Bank, 2002; Aguilera and Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2009), it demonstrates that a high degree of heterogeneity exists when it comes 
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to the importance that SA listed companies attach to CG. Evidence of improving CG 
standards among the sampled companies, however, implies that contrary to general 
concerns (Kakabadse and Korac-Kakabadse, 2002; West, 2009), the current voluntary 
compliance regime has had some positive impact on CG practices of SA listed firms.  
Insert Table IV about here 
All our hypotheses are tested by ordinary least squares (OLS), requiring an initial 
investigation of multicollinearity, autocorrelation, normality, homoscedasticity and 
linearity. Table V contains the correlation matrix for all variables employed in our 
analysis to test for multicollinearity. For robust results, both the Pearson’s parametric and 
Spearman’s non-parametric coefficients are reported and, noticeably, the magnitude and 
direction of both coefficients are very similar, suggesting that no serious non-normality 
problems exist. Both indicate further that correlations among the variables are fairly low, 
implying that there are no major multicollinearity problems. We additionally examined 
(for brevity not reported here, but available on request) scatter plots for P-P and Q-Q, 
studentised residuals, Cook’s distances and Durbin-Watson statistics for 
homoscedasticity, linearity, normality and autocorrelation, respectively, with the tests 
indicating no serious violation of these OLS assumptions. 
Insert Table V about here 
Table V suggests statistically significant links between the SACGDI and the 
explanatory variables, and also between the SACGDI and the control variables. 
Consistent with our predictions, audit firm size, board size, cross-listing, government 
ownership and institutional ownership are significantly and positively related to the 
SACGDI, while block ownership is significantly and negatively associated with the 
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SACGDI. With respect to the control (general) variables, the results indicate that larger 
and profitable firms disclose significantly more, as hypothesised. However, evidence that 
firms with higher investment and gearing disclose significantly less, as well as evidence 
of no significant link between growth firms and voluntary CG disclosure, is not 
consistent with our hypotheses. 
 
5.2 Empirical results: OLS (multivariate) regression analysis 
Table VI reports the results of regression analysis of the determinants of voluntary 
CG disclosure. Columns 3 and 4 present the results of a pooled[6] OLS regression of the 
SACGDI on the determinants and control variables. Generally, the results indicate that the 
SA context-specific factors, including ownership characteristics and the other CG 
variables, are significant in explaining voluntary CG disclosures. For example, the 
coefficient on block ownership is significant and negative, implying that companies with 
block ownership disclose less and providing support to theoretical suggestions that block 
ownership reduces agency problems by acting as a substitute for good CG practices 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This also supports H1 and the results of previous studies, 
which suggest that block ownership impacts negatively on disclosure (Patel et al., 2002; 
Barako et al., 2006; Mangena and Chamsia, 2008), but is inconsistent with the findings of 
those that report a positive link between block ownership and disclosure (Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2002; Eng and Mak, 2003; Tsamenyi et al., 2007).  
The coefficients on government ownership, institutional ownership, audit firm 
size, board size, the presence of a CG committee and cross-listing are positive and 
significant, at least at the 10% level, indicating that H2 to H7 are supported. The positive 
association between government ownership and voluntary CG disclosure is consistent 
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with the findings of Eng and Mak (2003), as well as the broader objectives of government 
investments. Through the PIC, the SA government holds significant ownership stakes in 
major corporations with keen interest in positively influencing CG, affirmative action and 
stakeholder issues. Evidence that cross-listed firms engage in higher disclosure provides 
support to the findings of past studies (Deutsche Bank, 2002; Collett and Hrasky, 2005), 
as well as the view that cross-listed firms will invariably be expected to disclose more 
due to the additional CG and disclosure requirements that they have to comply with. The 
significant positive relationship between board size and voluntary CG disclosure rejects 
the findings of Ho and Williams (2003) and Mangena and Chamisa (2008), while 
evidence that audit firm size impacts positively on disclosure is consistent with the results 
of previous studies (Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Eng and Mak, 2003; Tsamenyi et al., 2007).  
Insert Table VI about here 
Generally, the coefficients on the control (general) variables in columns 3 and 4 
of Table VI exhibit the hypothesised signs. For example, and consistent with the findings 
of previous studies (Cooke, 1989; 1992; Meek et al., 1995), firm size and profitability are 
significant and positively related to voluntary CG disclosure. In line with the results of 
previous studies (Barako et al., 2006; Henry, 2008), voluntary CG disclosure 
significantly differs across different industries and years, and noticeably, disclosure is 
significantly less in 2002 and basic materials, but significantly more in consumers 
services (highest significant coefficient) and 2006 compared with the other years and 
industries, respectively. However, the negative and insignificant coefficients on capital 
expenditure and growth, as well as the insignificant coefficient on gearing again reject 
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our hypotheses, but provide support for the results of Eng and Mak (2003) and Haniffa 
and Cooke (2002) who find no link between these variables and voluntary disclosure. 
 
5.3 Robustness analyses 
We conduct additional analyses to examine the robustness of our results. As 
previously explained, all 50 provisions constituting the SACGDI are equally weighted, 
but the number of provisions varies across the five sections, resulting in different weights 
being assigned to each section: board, directors, and ownership (54%); accounting and 
auditing (12%); risk management, internal audit and control (10%); integrated 
sustainability reporting (18%); and compliance and enforcement (6%). To check whether 
our findings are sensitive to the weighting of the five sections, we construct an alternative 
SACGDI, defined as Weighted-SACGDI, in which each section is awarded equal weight 
of 20%. Our results presented in columns 5 and 6 of Table VI differ slightly in that 
government ownership and the presence of a CG committee are now insignificant, but the 
general conclusions remain unaltered. 
 Additionally, variations in the opportunities and difficulties that corporations 
encounter differ over time, implying that voluntary CG disclosure behaviour may be 
jointly determined by unobserved firm-level characteristics (Henry, 2008), which simple 
OLS regression may fail to identify. Hence, given the panel nature of our dataset, we 
estimate a fixed-effects model to control for possible unobserved firm-specific 
heterogeneity. This involves re-estimating equation (1), with the introduction of 168 
dummies to represent the 169 sampled firms. Our fixed-effects results contained in 
columns 7 and 8 of Table VI remain essentially unchanged, suggesting that our results are 
not sensitive to potential unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity.  
 22  
 
 
6. Summary and conclusion 
 South Africa (SA) has pursued close to two decades of corporate governance (CG) 
reforms in the form of the 1994 (King I) and 2002 (King II) King Reports, notably 
adopting the UK-style voluntary (‘comply or explain’) compliance regime. However, the 
SA corporate context is characterised by concentrated ownership, greater need to meet 
affirmative action and stakeholder CG provisions, weak enforcement of corporate 
regulations and high levels of institutional ownership, but weaker shareholder activism, 
raising critical concerns as to whether a voluntary compliance regime will be effective in 
improving CG standards. The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to examine whether and 
to what extent SA listed companies voluntarily comply with King II, and if so, the major 
SA context-specific, as well as general factors influencing such voluntary compliance and 
disclosure behaviour. We use a sample of 169 SA firms from 2002 to 2006 and 50 CG 
provisions based on King II for our analysis. 
 First, analysis of the levels of compliance with the constructed voluntary 
compliance and disclosure index generally indicates that, despite the expectation that the 
introduction of King II would speed-up convergence of CG standards, CG practices 
among SA listed corporations still vary substantially. At the aggregate levels, the scores 
range from a minimum of 6% to a maximum of 98% with the average sampled company 
complying with 61% of the 50 CG provisions analysed, as well as the mean CG score 
increasing from 47% in 2002 to 69% in 2006. While this is consistent with the variation 
in compliance levels reported by past studies, it demonstrates that a high degree of 
heterogeneity exists when it comes to the importance that SA listed companies attach to 
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CG. However, despite concerns as to whether a voluntary CG regime will be effective 
given the uniqueness of the SA corporate context, the scores suggest that compliance 
levels and CG standards among the sampled companies have generally improved over the 
five-year period examined. 
 Second, our analysis of the SA context-specific factors driving voluntary 
compliance and disclosure suggests that ownership characteristics and other CG variables 
are generally significant in explaining variations in disclosure. Specifically, our results 
indicate that an increase in block ownership significantly reduces voluntary CG 
disclosure, implying substitutability between block ownership and CG disclosure, as a 
managerial monitoring mechanism. In contrast, we find that companies with a larger 
board size, higher government ownership, higher institutional ownership, a big-four 
auditor and a CG committee, disclose significantly more; an indication that these 
variables are complementary to voluntary CG disclosure. With respect to the general 
factors, the results show that larger and profitable companies, as well as firms in the 
consumer services sector, disclose more. CG disclosure scores are also significantly 
higher in 2006 than in 2002. However, we do not find any evidence that highly geared 
and high growth firms disclose significantly more or less than their counterparts. Our 
results are generally robust whether we use a weighted or an unweighted index and 
whether or not we control for firm-level fixed-effects. 
 Third, our findings have important implications for policy-makers and regulators. 
Evidence of increasing compliance with King II implies that efforts by various 
stakeholders, notably the SA Institute of Directors and the JSE Ltd, at improving CG 
standards in SA companies have had some positive effect on CG practices of SA firms. 
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However, the substantial variation in the levels of compliance with important provisions, 
such as having an independent board chairperson, suggests that enforcement may need to 
be strengthened further. In this regard, setting up a ‘compliance and enforcement 
committee’ to continuously monitor compliance levels among listed companies may be a 
step in the right direction. 
 Finally, while our findings are important and robust, some caveats are considered 
appropriate. We employ a dichotomous scheme which considers every CG disclosure as 
equally important. Whilst results based on our unweighted and weighted indices are 
generally the same, future studies may improve their analysis by constructing weighted 
and un-weighted CG disclosure indices. Also, due to data limitations, our analysis is 
restricted to seven factors that can influence voluntary CG disclosure. As data availability 
improves, future studies may need to investigate how other potential determinants, such 
as foreign ownership and the number of analysts, affect voluntary CG disclosure.    
 
 
 
Notes 
 
1. As the regulatory framework and capital structure of financials and utilities differ from non-
financials, as well as following past research (Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002), 
these industries, with a total of 111 listed companies, were excluded, leaving eight industries and 
291 listed corporations to be sampled. 
2. As Panel B of Table I indicates, for 94 of the remaining 122 companies, two or more years’ 
accounting data and annual reports were not available in the DataStream/Perfect Information 
Database. For the other 28 companies, both accounting data and annual reports were missing. 
3. Since ordinal coding is appropriate when measuring corporate disclosures in which reasonable 
differences in the degree of disclosures can be expected (Marston and Shrives, 1991; Botosan, 
1997; Beattie et al., 2004; Beattie and Thomson, 2007), we adopt binary coding. As can be seen 
from the Appendix, with the exception of the nine provisions contained in the integrated 
sustainability reporting section (Section 4 of the Appendix), where some level of judgement is 
involved, the remaining provisions involve a straightforward present (‘1’) or absent (‘0’) 
disclosures. For example, the board chairperson is either independent (‘1’) or not (‘0’), a firm has 
split the positions of chairperson and CEO (‘1’) or not (‘0’), and so on. This leaves limited 
avenues to qualitatively discriminate among disclosure levels, such as meaningfully differentiating 
between firms that provide a quantification of the information disclosed or not, and thus using 
ordinal coding is inappropriate. With respect to the integrated sustainability reporting provisions, a 
firm only receives a value of ‘1’ if its narratives are explicit as to the specific steps taken and the 
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results achieved during a financial year as recommended by King II. All other disclosures, 
including those that seek to explain why a firm has been unable to comply with a particular 
provision in its annual report receive a value of ‘0’. 
4. For lack of sufficient number of observations in three industries, namely health care, oil & gas, 
and telecommunications industries with three, one and three listed firms, respectively, 
observations from these industries were merged with the closest remaining five major industries. 
As a result (see Panel B of Table I), the three health care firms were added to the consumer 
services industry, the one oil & gas firm was included in the basic materials industry, while the 
three telecommunications companies were included in the technology firms. 
5. To minimise the effects of outliers, we winsorise all the variables at the conventional 1% and 99% 
levels. However, the whole regression analysis was first run with the outliers included, and the 
results were essentially the same. The main rationale for winsorising is to minimise potentially 
serious violations of the OLS assumptions. 
6. To make sure that the residuals of a given firm may not be correlated across different years (time-
series dependence) or firms (cross-sectional dependence) within our five-year panel (Gujarati, 
2003), and following Pertersen (2009), we apply the empirically robust Clustered Standard Errors 
technique to estimate the coefficients, in addition to estimating a firm-level fixed-effects model to 
minimise potential residual dependence. 
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Appendix. Full list of the South African corporate governance disclosure index  
       provisions based on King II 
 
Section 1: Board, directors and ownership 
 
1. Whether the roles of chairperson and CEO/MD are split. 
2. Whether the chairperson of the board is an independent non-executive director. 
3. Whether the board is composed by a majority of non-executive directors (NEDs). 
4. Whether the board meets at least four times in a year. 
5. Whether individual directors’ meetings record is disclosed. 
6. Whether directors are clearly classified into executive, NED, and independent. 
7. Whether chairperson’s performance and effectiveness is evaluated and disclosed. 
8. Whether CEO/MD’s performance and effectiveness is appraised and disclosed. 
9. Whether the board’s performance and effectiveness is evaluated and disclosed.  
10. Whether the board subcommittees’ performance and effectiveness is evaluated. 
11. Whether directors’ biography, experience and responsibilities are disclosed. 
12. Whether a policy that prohibits directors, officers and employees (insider) share 
dealings around the release of price sensitive information is disclosed. 
13. The existence of the office of company secretary. 
14. Whether a nomination committee has been established. 
15. Whether the nomination committee consists of a majority independent NEDs. 
16. Whether the chairperson of the nomination committee is an independent NED. 
17. Whether the membership of the nomination committee is disclosed. 
18. Whether the nomination committee’s members’ meetings attendance record is 
disclosed. 
19. Whether a remuneration committee has been established. 
20. Whether the remuneration committee is constituted entirely by independent NEDs. 
21. Whether the chairperson of the remuneration committee is an independent NED. 
22. Whether the membership of the remuneration committee is disclosed. 
23. Whether the remuneration committee’s members’ meetings attendance record is 
disclosed. 
24. Whether directors’ remuneration, interests, and share options are disclosed. 
25. Whether director remuneration philosophy and procedure is disclosed. 
26. Whether directors’ have access to free independent professional legal advice. 
27.  Whether share ownership by all insiders, including management, employees, 
directors and officers is less than 50% of the total company shareholdings. 
 
Section 2: Accounting and auditing 
 
28. Whether an audit committee has been established. 
29. Whether the audit committee is constituted by at least 2 independent NEDs with 
significant professional financial training and experience. 
30. Whether the chairperson of the audit committee is an independent NED. 
31. Whether the membership of the audit committee is disclosed. 
32. Whether the audit committee’s members’ meetings attendance record is disclosed. 
33. Whether a board statement on the going-concern status of the firm is disclosed. 
 27  
 
 
Section 3: Risk management, internal audit and control 
 
34. Whether a risk management committee has been established. 
35. Whether the risk committee’s members’ meetings attendance record is disclosed. 
36. Whether a narrative on both actual and potential future systematic and non-
systematic risks is disclosed. 
37. Whether a narrative on existing internal control systems (including internal audit) 
is disclosed. 
38. Whether a narrative on how current and future assessed company risks will be 
managed is disclosed. 
 
Section 4: Integrated sustainability reporting (Non-financial information) 
 
39. Whether a narrative on how a firm is actually complying with and implementing 
the broad-based black economic empowerment and empowerment of women laws, 
including black equity ownership, preferential procurement, enterprise 
development, and executive management control is disclosed. 
40. Whether a narrative on how a firm is actually complying with and implementing 
employment equity laws in terms of gender, age, ethnicity and disabilities is 
disclosed. 
41. Whether a narrative on how a firm is addressing the threat posed by HIV/Aids 
pandemic in South Africa is disclosed. 
42. Whether a narrative on the actual measures taken by a firm to address 
occupational health and safety of its employees is disclosed. 
43. Whether a narrative on how a firm is actually complying with and implementing 
rules and regulations on the environment is disclosed.  
44. Whether a narrative on the existence of a code of ethics is disclosed. 
45. Whether a firm’s board is formed by at least 1 white and 1 non-white (board 
diversity on the basis of ethnicity) person. 
46. Whether a firm’s board is formed by at least 1 male and 1 female (board diversity 
on the basis of gender) person. 
47. Whether a narrative on the actual community support and other corporate social 
investments or responsibilities is disclosed. 
 
Section 5: Encouraging voluntary compliance and enforcement 
 
48. Whether a positive statement on the compliance or non-compliance with the 
corporate governance provisions of King II is disclosed. 
49. Whether a narrative on how a firm is contributing towards the development of 
financial journalism is disclosed. 
50. Whether a narrative on what a firm is doing to encourage shareholder activism, 
like having investor relations department and proxy voting is disclosed. 
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Table I. Summary of the sample selection procedure 
Panel A: Industrial composition of firms listed on the  No. in each      Percentage 
 JSE available to be sampled as at 31/12/2006 industry        of sample  
Industrials              81   27.8 
Basic materials             67   23.0 
Consumer services             62   21.3  
Consumer goods             36   12.4  
Technology              31   10.7  
Health care                7     2.4        
Telecommunications               4     1.4  
Oil and gas                3     1.0 
Total firms available to be sampled         291                  100.0 
       Less:  Firms with no year’s data available        28     
                 Firms with some years’ data missing      94      122   41.9  
Total sampled firms with full data         169   58.1 
Panel B: Industrial composition of    No. in each      Percentage  
   sampled firms with full data   industry      of sample  
Industrials               51   30.2 
Consumer services             35   20.7 
Basic materials              33   19.5  
Consumer goods             24   14.2  
Technology              19   11.2  
Health care                3     1.8        
Telecommunications                3     1.8  
Oil and gas                1     0.6 
Total sampled firms with full data         169                       100.0 
Source: The Johannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE) Ltd.  
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Table II. Summary of variables 
Dependent variable 
SACGDI Corporate governance (CG) compliance and disclosure index containing 
50 provisions from King II that takes a value of 1 if each of the 50 CG 
provisions is disclosed, 0 otherwise; scaled to a value between 0% and 
100%. 
Independent variables 
BLKOWN Percentage of shares held by shareholders with at least 5% of the total  
  company shareholdings. 
INSOWN  Percentage of shares held by institutional shareholders. 
GOVOWN 1, if government ownership is greater than 5%, 0 otherwise. 
BSIZE  Natural log of the total number of directors on the board of a company. 
BIG4  1, if a firm is audited by a big-four audit firm (PricewaterhouseCoopers,  
Deloitte & Touché, Ernst & Young, and KPMG), 0 otherwise.  
CROSLIST 1, if a firm is cross-listed on a foreign stock market, 0 otherwise.  
CGCOM 1, if a firm has set up a corporate governance committee, 0 otherwise. 
Control variables 
ROA (%) Ratio of operating profit (wc01250) to total assets (wc02999). 
CAPEX (%) Ratio of total capital expenditure (wc04601) to total assets (wc02999). 
GEAR (%) Ratio of total debt (wc03255) to market value (mv) of equity.  
GROWT (%) Current year’s sales (wc01001) minus last year’s sales to last year’s sales. 
INDUSTRY Dummies for each of the 5 main industries: basic material + oil gas;  
consumer goods, consumer services + health care; industrials; and  
technology + telecommunications firms. 
LNTA  Natural log of total assets (wc02999). 
YEAR  Dummies for each of the five years from 2002 to 2006 inclusive. 
Notes: The codes in parentheses refer to DataStream codes for the respective accounting and market 
variables used in the analysis. 
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Table III. Summary descriptive statistics of all variables for all (845) firm years 
Variable     Mean Median         Std. dev.       Maximum      Minimum 
SACGDI      0.61    0.64  0.19             0.98            0.06  
Return on assets     0.11    0.12  0.14  0.38           -0.19  
Board size      9.75  10.00             3.67           18.00            4.00 
Block ownership     0.62    0.65             0.18  0.92            0.10 
Institutional ownership   0.74    0.82  0.23  0.98            0.09  
Government ownership  0.38    0.00  0.49  1.00            0.00 
Growth      0.12    0.14  0.26            0.89           -0.44 
Capital expenditure     0.13    0.08  0.15  0.66            0.07 
Gearing      0.32    0.19             0.31             0.78            0.01 
Firm size      5.86    6.02  0.48  7.83            4.24 
CG committee      0.32    0.00  0.47  1.00            0.00 
Audit firm size     0.73    1.00  0.44  1.00            0.00 
Cross-listing      0.22    0.00  0.41  1.00            0.00 
Notes: Table II above provides the full definitions of all the variables used. 
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Table IV. The levels of compliance with the corporate governance (CG) 
     provisions of King II among the sampled companies 
       Compliance levels among companies(%) 
CG provisions of the SACGDI   All        2002      2003     2004    2005      2006 
Aggregate mean scores of the SACGDI  61   47   58   64   66    69 
Individual CG provisions of the SACGDI All 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
1. Board, directors and ownership: 
Role duality     74    61    64    77    83    86  
Board composition    63    55    61    67    65    66 
Board chairperson    32    17    25    34    42    44 
Frequency of board meetings   78    65    75    82    84    84 
Individual directors meetings attendance  68    36    65    76    78    83  
Disclosure of directors’ biography  97    94    96    98    98    98 
Disclosure of director classification  73    49    70    78    84    84 
Appraisal of chair performance & effect. 12    04    08    12    16    19 
Appraisal of CEO/MD perf. & effectiveness 11    03    10    13    12    15 
Evaluation of board perf. & effectiveness 26    10    24    31    31    33 
Evaluat. of board subcom. Perf. & effect. 15    05    12    14    18    25  
Director/officer dealings & securities  69    55    65    72    74    77 
Office of the company secretary              100           100       100        100       100       100 
Existence of nomination committee  47    26    42     52     54     60  
Composition of nomination committee  28    10    26     30     35     38 
Chairperson of nomination committee  29    10    23     32     38     43 
Disclosure of nom. com. Membership  46    23    41     51     54     59 
Nom. com. members’ meetings attendance 32    09    25     36     43     46 
Existence of remuneration committee  91    85    90     91     92     95 
Composition of remuneration committee 17    10    14     17     21     24  
Chairperson of remuneration committee  47    29    39     53     55     61 
Disclosure of rem. committee membership 84    76    81     85     86     93 
Rem. com. members’ meetings attendance 49    18    40     57     63     67 
Directors’ rem., interests & share options 98    93    99     99     99     99 
Philosophy & procedure of director rem.  37    28    36     39     40     40 
Director access to free legal advice  79    71    79     81     82     82  
Internal ownership    55    60    58     52     51     56 
2. Accounting and auditing: 
Existence of audit committee   91    87    88     90     93     95  
Composition of audit committee   47    28    41     51     52     61 
Chairperson of audit committee   49    26    48     55     56     60 
Disclosure of audit com. membership  86    79    84     86     87     94 
Audit com. members’ meetings attendance 54    21    49     63     68     71 
Narrative on the ‘going-concern   98    97    98     98     99     99 
3. Risk Management, internal audit and control: 
Disclosure of company risks   97    96    95     97     98    98 
Disclosure of policy on risks management 82    74    81     84     85    88 
Disclosure policy on internal control system 90    89    87     89     91    94 
Existence of risk management committee 61    40    59     66     67    73 
Risk mgt. com. Members’ metngs. Attendance 41    10    35     47     54    57 
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Continuation: Table IV 
            Compliance levels among companies(%) 
Individual CG provisions of the SACGDI All      2002      2003     2004    2005      2006 
4. Integrated sustainability reporting: 
Black economic empowerment  practices 67  51  60  71  77   84 
HIV/AIDS policies and practices  62  45  59  66  70   70 
Health and safety policies and practices  54  36  42  59  64   68 
Employment equity policies and practices 83  80  80  84  83   86 
Good environmental policies and practices 59  47  53  62  67   68 
Corporate social Investment policies/practices 63  54  63  62  67   69 
Disclosure of company code of ethics  85  76  83  85  89   90 
Board diversity on the basis of ethnicity  76  69  73  76  78   86 
Board diversity on the basis of gender  50  39  45  51  55   60 
5. Voluntary compliance & enforcement: 
Contribution to devt. of financial Journalism   0    0    0    0    0     0 
Encouraging shareholder activism  52  37  47  55  57   62 
Compliance/non-compliance with King II 98  96  97  99  99   98 
Notes: This Table reports both the aggregate and individual levels of compliance with the 50 corporate 
governance (CG) provisions from the 2002 King Report (King II). Column 2 of the table reports 
compliance levels (%) for all five firm-years for the 169 sampled companies, while Columns 3 to 7 report 
compliance levels for each of the five firm-years investigated. 
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Table V. Correlation matrix of all variables for all (845) firm years  
Variable             ROA        SACGDI       GOVOWN       BSIZE       BLKOWN      INSOWN      GROWTH       CAPEX        LNTA        GEAR       BIG4     CROSLIST   CGCOM 
ROA                   .310***        .170***          .166***         -.023             .167***         .241**          -.197***        .130***      -.289***     .108***  .163***      .173*** 
 
SACGDI             .318***         .387***          .503***        -.171***          .298***          .049             -.123***        .585***       -.090**      .395***       .405***    .439***  
 
GOVOWN         .167***         .363***               .389***       -.179***         .216***          .104**          -.032             .445***      -.035         .298***       .375***      .366*** 
        
BSIZE            .170***          .575***        .377***     -.098**         .298***           .095**           .065            .520***       .080*         .387***  .379***      .309*** 
        
BLKOWN         -.045            -.184***       -.159***        -.067                             .410***         .022     .055          -.138***        .024         -.012         -.031   -.111*** 
 
INSOWN           .091**            .289***        .220***         .278***         .370***                 .069   -.069            .276***       -.046         .109***  .256***    .244*** 
  
GROWTH          .085*           -.004        .079**          .090**          .028             .053          -.044            .128***       -.098**       .012          -.018    .026 
 
CAPEX           -.081*           -.116***       -.113***       -.078*            .049           -.082**           -.058                      .089**          .412***      .075*   .050   -.008 
 
LNTA            .251***          .565***        .416***         .497***       -.182***        .256***           .129***        -.036                             .103**        .430***           .428***    .398***  
 
GEAR           -.150***          .063       -.147***        -.076*           .045           -.078**           -.068*           .392***       -.042                              -.036   -.045    .064  
 
BIG4            .133***          .395***         .295***        .368***       -.059            .109**             .020           -.014            .423***       -.075*    .248***    .277*** 
  
CROSLIST        .176***          .377***         .371***        .369***       -.041            .177***          -.010           -.104**         .418***       -.102**         .248***                    .439*** 
 
CGCOM            .185***          .425***         .364***        .310***       -.108**         .239***           .044            -.088**         .370***       -.135***       .277***       .439*** 
Notes: The bottom left half of the table contains Pearson’s parametric correlation coefficients, whereas the upper right half of the table shows Spearman’s non-
parametric correlation coefficients.  ***, ** and * indicate that correlation is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Variables are defined as 
follows: Return on assets (ROA), the South African corporate governance disclosure index (SACGDI), government ownership (GOVOWN), board size (BSIZE), 
block ownership (BLKOWN), institutional ownership (INSOWN), growth (GROWTH), capital expenditure (CAPEX), firm size (LNTA), gearing (GEAR), audit 
firm size (BIG4), cross-listing (CROSLIST), and the presence of a corporate governance committee (CGCOM). Table II above fully defines all the variables used. 
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Table VI. Regression analysis of the determinants of voluntary corporate governance disclosures 
        SACGDI     Weighted-SACGDI      Fixed effects model  
Independent Variables  Predicted sign  Coefficients P-values Coefficients P-values Coefficients     P-values  
Ownership variables 
   Block ownership   -  -0.197  (.000)*** -0.123  (.000)*** -0.206             (.000)*** 
   Government ownership  +   0.123  (.043)**   0.080  (.154)   0.385             (.000)*** 
   Institutional ownership  +   0.150  (.028)**   0.216  (.000)***   0.103             (.091)*  
Other explanatory variables 
   Audit firm size   +   0.148  (.056)*   0.112  (.084)*   0.260             (.000)***  
   Board size    -/+   0.537  (.000)***   0.386  (.041)**   0.215             (.052)*   
   CG committee   +   0.659  (.002)***   0.023  (.136)    0.286             (.034)** 
   Cross-listing    +   0.104  (.067)*   0.440  (.000)***   0.350             (.026)** 
Control variables 
   Capital expenditure   +  -0.032  (.149)  -0.052  (.127)  -0.025             (.218)  
   Firm size    +   0.740  (.000)***   0.536  (.000)***   0.480             (.000)*** 
   Gearing    +   0.012  (.424)   0.030  (.316)   0.010             (.483) 
   Growth    +  -0.038  (.356)  -0.024  (.405)  -0.013             (.495) 
   Profitability (Return on assets) +   0.569  (.000)***   0.371  (.000)***   0.347             (.000)*** 
   Basic materials     -0.065  (.596)  -0.082  (.458)  -0.039             (.637) 
   Consumer services      0.577  (.000)***  0.546  (.000)***  0.469             (.000)*** 
   Industrials       0.385  (.037)**   0.432  (.015)**   0.398             (.036)** 
   Technology       0.327  (.041)**    0.269  (.046)**    0.185             (.058)* 
   2002       -0.718  (.000)*** -0.705  (.000)*** -0.684             (.000)*** 
   2004        0.520  (.028)**   0.364  (.039)**   0.253             (.047)** 
   2005        0.763  (.000)***   0.685  (.000)***   0.479             (.000)*** 
   2006        0.941  (.000)***   0.896  (.000)***   0.762             (.000)*** 
Constant      -0.150  (.354)  -0.128  (.431)  -0.180  (.317) 
Standard error        0.698     0.673     0.620 
Durbin-Watson statistics      2.082     2.114     2.201 
F-value         6.540***    7.839***    9.714*** 
Adjusted R2        0.451     0.432     0.498 
Number of observations          845        845        845 
Notes: Coefficients are in front of parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The consumer goods industry and 
year 2003 are captured by the constant term. Table II above fully defines all the variables used.                                                            
